Important targets, such as Liverpool and Belfast, were out of range for the slow He 59. After experiencing a number of technical difficulties, the operations then declined. Permission to resume these attacks was finally granted by the German naval staff, following which He 59s were used to lay naval mines in the Downs, Thames Estuary and off Sheerness. Nevertheless, in early 1940 co-operation with Kriegsmarine surface vessels and U-boats was almost non-existent.Įarly in WWII, attacks on British ground targets were prohibited by the German Supreme Command.
It could also be used to provide targets for U-boats, although in the vast expanse of the Atlantic this was often less than useful it could be used to carry out direct attacks on enemy surface assets and it could be used in mine laying to inhibit enemy movements.
Air power could, for example, potentially be harnessed to provide timely reconnaissance to allow surface raiders to reach the Atlantic without detection and, if necessary, provide air intervention. Different plans worked out by the Oberkommando der Kriegsmarine attempted to achieve closer aerial co-operation with vessels of the German navy. Using improved and better aircraft, including land-based types such as the Ju 88 that exhibited far better performance characteristics than the then current maritime types, more effective methods of maritime warfare were explored. Initially therefore the main task of the air units assigned to the Kriegsmarine was coastal reconnaissance. In late 1938 the supreme command of the German Navy ( Oberkommando der Kriegsmarine) began to examine the application of air power to naval operations, although, since the Third Reich confidently expected at this stage to avoid a war with Britain, planning would have been for a worst-case scenario, rather than to meet a specific expectation. Atlantic LUFTWAFFE AT WAR AIRWAR OVER THE ATLANTIC
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